The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, ____ (), Immanent realism: an introduction to Brentano. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth. Intencionalidad y verdad en el juicio: Una propuesta de Brentano (Publicaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Navarra. Colección.

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Not so with belief, as we shall see momentarily. This dilemma has been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind.

What is the phenomenal character—the phenomenology—of the various forms of human experience? On the other hand, it would show that some of the normativity of mental states is already exhibited by biological functions intsncionalidad Neander, The relational nature of singular thoughts Many non-intentional relations hold of concrete particulars in intencioanlidad and time.

According to Russell, most thoughts that seem prima facie to be about concrete individuals are in fact not singular thoughts but generally quantified propositions. For further discussion, see the papers collected in Jeshion ed. On the one hand, by making intensionality the criterion of intentionality, one in effect espouses a general linguistic view of intentionality. Notice, however, that whereas biological organs brentaho functions that may fail to be fulfilled, they do not ipso facto exhibit intentionality in Brentano’s full sense: Whether the intentionalist account can be extended to the phenomenal character of all experiences is at present an open question cf.

Added to PP index Total downloads 1 1, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 1of 2, How can I increase my downloads? Let two identical twins both simultaneously believe brentank the cup in front of them contains coffee.

Aquilina Satue Alvarez, La doctrina de la intencionalidad en Franz Brentano – PhilPapers

If so, then reports of what a compass indicates exhibit one of Chisholm’s features of intensionality, namely coextensive terms are not freely substitutable salva veritate in such reports. Besides being a belief i. On his view, the fountain of youth is an object that instantiates both the property of being a fountain and that of having waters which confer everlasting life. Consider a vending machine designed to yield drinks upon receiving coins worth one Euro.


From the same conclusion, Quinepresented an influential dilemma with both epistemological and ontological implications.

Bibliografía | El concepto de intencionalidad en la fenomenología como psicología descriptiva

This is the problem of the relational nature of the contents of true singular beliefs. For further discussion, see the entry on Bertrand Russell. On the one hand, the notion of transitive creature consciousness seems like a close cousin to brentsno notion of intentionality. Would you like to tell us about a lower price? Sentences that involve or are about modalities such as necessity, about natural laws, about causation all exhibit intensionality.

History of Western Philosophy. One possible response might be to bite the bullet and deny that nonepistemic perception is intenckonalidad intentional state at all.

Now, selection processes can be intentional or non-intentional. No keywords specified fix it. If 16 is true, so is To show that one can do so, however, is no easy task. But in the latter case, it is. See Crane, for further discussion. Two features are characteristic of extensionality. But according to singularism, not all thoughts brentno objects are mediated by thoughts about their properties. But since they claim that intentionality in turn derives from phenomenal consciousness, they are not quite faithful to the spirit of Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the constitutive feature of the mental.

They hold brentamo to be the true criterion of the mental.

Of course, some definite descriptions e. It is not entirely fixed by the internal physical and functional state of the individual’s brain.

Now the following questions arise: Arguably, it is essential to the proposition that Ava believes—the proposition expressed by an utterance of 2 —that it is intencionalidaf Jospin and the property of being a Socialist.

For further discussion see section 7.


La doctrina de la intencionalidad en Franz Brentano

Whether Brentano was right or not, why should we want a mark or a criterion of the mental at all? Russell found this view of intentional objects ontologically unacceptable since it involves the acceptance of entities such as golden mountains which are inconsistent with physical and chemical laws and round squares which are inconsistent with the laws of geometry.

Even though two metal disks might be physically indistinguishable, one might be a genuine Euro coin and the other might be a counterfeit. Most would claim that a solution to the problem of intencionwlidad is not ipso facto a solution to the problem of consciousness.

Ever since Frege, it has been standard practice in analytic philosophy to investigate the intentional structure of much brenhano thought by inquiring into the logical structure of the language used by speakers to express it or to ascribe it to others. Given Mally’s distinction, the fact that there is an object which is determined by the properties of being golden and of being a mountain does not contradict the contingent fact that nothing brenntano these two properties, nor does Mally have to think of intentional objects as non-existent.


Similarly, it is the function of a desire and an intention to represent a non-actual possible or impossible state of affairs. Before examining various contradictory answers to these questions, a preliminary question is relevant. Is intentionality a feature of every aspect of human experience? Now, the view that availability to consciousness is the true criterion of the mental entails that states and processes that inteniconalidad investigated by cognitive science and that are unavailable to consciousness will fail to qualify as genuine mental states.


For further discussion, see the entry on Gottlob Frege. There’s a problem loading this menu at the moment.